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Abstract
Deregulation of the use of temporary workers in 2004 (the Worker Dispatching Act
of 2004) has been regarded as an important reason for the recent rise of temporary
workers in Japan. However, the shift from permanent to temporary workers began
long before. This paper empirically explores links between the shift from permanent to
temporary workers in the Japanese manufacturing sector and economic globalization,
using industry-level data. We find that outsourcing is positively correlated with the
replacement of permanent workers with temporary workers in domestic production. In
addition, we find that industries losing world share of value added tend to decrease
the employment of permanent workers. Industries with higher exports or imports are
aggressive in using temporary workers, which suggests the role of temporary workers as
an employment buffer.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in temporary workers in the Japanese
manufacturing sector. According to the Census of Establishment and Firms, during 2001–
2006, the total manufacturing workforce decreased by 0.6 million, with 1 million permanent
workers lost and 0.4 million temporary positions created. About 40% of permanent work
has been replaced with temporary work. This trend of substantial shifts from permanent
workers to temporary workers has already resulted in a broad range of debates on employ-
ment stability, income inequality, and human capital accumulation in the Japanese political
arena.1
It has been postulated that relaxing regulations on temporary workers is an important
reason for the rise of temporary workers in Japan. For example, by allowing the manufac-
turing sector to use workers dispatched from private agencies, the Worker Dispatching Act,
enacted in 2004, may be responsible for manufacturers’ more aggressive use of temporary
workers. Nevertheless, economic globalization such as trade and foreign direct investment
(FDI) may also play a role in the rapid increase in temporary work by downplaying national
borders and thereby encouraging firms to reconsider labor contracts with their employees. In
particular, in countries with strong labor protections and rigid labor markets, such as Euro-
pean countries and Japan, firms have faced more pressure from substantial labor adjustment
costs. As anecdotal evidence, a report published by Nippon Keidanren, Japan’s largest lob-
bying group, composed of 1,281 companies and 129 industrial associations, claimed that
labor market flexibility and more aggressive use of temporary workers were vital because of
increasing market uncertainty and sales volatility caused by incrementally tougher global
competition.2
It is important to examine the effects of trade and FDI on labor contracts, because
firms’ choice of labor contracts potentially influences the bargaining position of workers
and human capital accumulation, yet the choice has rarely been investigated as a source of
1For example, an increase of temporary workers leads to a decline in future productivity due to the lack of
job training within firms. It also may hinder skill formation for younger employees, leading to a concomitant
difficulty in switching to permanent jobs when they are available. Jones (2007) argued that an increase in
the proportion of the workforce in low-paying, non-permanent positions compared with permanent workers
(labor-market dualism) was a main reason for recent increases in income inequality in Japan.
2The report (in Japanese) is available at http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2004/041/index.html
as of October 2015.
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distributional effects of trade. This paper investigates whether trade and FDI encourage
manufacturers to reduce permanent workers and use temporary workers more aggressively.
We present two hypotheses to explain the shift from permanent to temporary workers in
the face of global competition and test those using industry-level data. The first hypoth-
esis is that when facing better opportunities for FDI or outsourcing, manufacturers prefer
lower labor adjustment costs in domestic production. Temporary workers have much lower
dismissal costs than permanent workers. Consequently, manufacturers increase the pro-
portion of temporary workers among their labor input for expected labor adjustment cost
savings. In a broad sense, domestic labor inputs become more substitutable with foreign
labor inputs as a result of economic globalization. The second hypothesis is that it is more
difficult for manufacturers to incentivize workers to accumulate firm-specific skills because
the employment relationship may become fragile under tougher competition. The employ-
ment of permanent workers is more protected than that of temporary workers. Hence,
permanent workers can be more easily motivated to accumulate firm-specific skills than can
be temporary workers, resulting in relative efficiency superiority in permanent workers.3
Because international trade provides a larger market and causes tough competition among
firms, firms face higher probability of exiting the market. In addition, R&D activity en-
couraged by international flows of knowledge capital may accelerate the introduction and
retirement of products. Firm-specific and product-specific skills become obsolete sooner in
such situations. These factors may lower the efficiency advantage of permanent workers
over temporary workers. As a result, firms come to use more temporary workers.
Our focus is consistent with some key characteristics of the Japanese labor market:
flexible, highly organized internal labor markets and substantial competitive fringes with
low pay and high turnover. While sustaining a flexible and highly organized labor market
incurs higher search costs in finding suitable workers as well as higher costs for firing workers,
competing on the fringe has much lower hiring and firing costs.4 In addition, we match
3If temporary jobs are potential “stepping stones” to permanent employment, workers on temporary
contracts might be motivated and provide high effort (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005). However, Booth,
Francesconi, and Frank (2002) empirically showed that even though there was some evidence that temporary
jobs are stepping stones to permanent jobs, temporary workers still faced lower probabilities of receiving
work-related training and tended to be poorly paid even after moving to permanent jobs (especially among
male temporary workers). It is also difficult for temporary workers to convert their labor contracts to
permanent ones in Japan (Shikata, 2012).
4In addition, temporary workers are usually unable to convert their employment contract to permanent
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information about temporary jobs with many trade-related variables to capture several
dimensions of global competition.
Using the Establishment and Enterprise Census, the Japan Industrial Productivity
Database 2009 (JIP 2009), and UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT), we
perform panel-data analyses and find evidence that economic globalization is associated
with the shift from permanent to temporary workers. Our main findings are as follows.
First, industries more reliant on outsourcing significantly tend to decrease the employment
of permanent workers, thereby increasing the ratio of temporary workers. This industry-
level finding is consistent with the firm-level finding by Tomiura, Ito, and Wakasugi (2011),
who evaluated the firm-level impact of offshoring on employment flexibility (the percent of
regular employment). Second, world share of value added as constructed from INDSTAT
supports the second hypothesis, that industries losing world share tend to decrease the em-
ployment of permanent workers. Third, industries relying more on foreign sales via export
or facing higher import penetration tend to increase the employment of temporary workers,
which implies that firms tend to use temporary workers more as a buffer against output
fluctuations in globally competitive environments.
[Related Literature] Our paper contributes to the literature of labor market flexibility.
A permanent-to-temporary shift in the labor force is not a phenomenon exclusive to Japan.
There is a rich body of literature that contributes to the study of temporary labor markets
in Europe. Dolado, Garcia-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002) reviewed the Spanish experience
of aggressively using temporary employment contracts since the mid-1980s.Blanchard and
Landier (2002) found that temporary workers in France who stay in entry-level jobs longer
were not likely to obtain permanent jobs. Holmlund and Storrie (2002) observed that
adverse Swedish macroeconomic conditions in the 1990s made firms more prone to offer
temporary jobs and workers more willing to accept such offers. More recently, Aguirre-
gabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2008) examined the impact on productivity following Spain’s
elimination of dismissal costs for permanent contracts. A literature of temporary and per-
manent workers is growing in Japan. Morikawa (2010), Asano, Ito, and Kawaguchi (2011),
employment. Firms do not invest in training temporary workers. Furthermore, the wage level of temporary
workers is almost 50% of that of permanent workers. As a result, firms can save (short-term) production
costs and set labor inputs as variable costs.
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and Matsuura, Sato, and Wakasugi (2011) argued that firm-level volatility also seemed to
be an important determinant of the shift from permanent to temporary workers. Our pa-
per first explores how economic globalization could affect firms’ demand for temporary and
permanent workers.
The relationship between trade and employment has been intensively examined in em-
pirical trade research. For example, Slaughter (2001) found that trade-related variables had
a mixed effect on increasing labor-demand elasticities. Tomiura (2003) found that import
competition intensity reduced employment in recessionary periods when the yen appreci-
ated. In addition, Tomiura (2004) showed that import competition also has a significant
effect on job creation and loss through plant startups and shutdowns. Using the assumption
that intense import competition causes firms and industries to switch away from implicit
contracts, Bertrand (2004) found that the sensitivity of wages to the current unemployment
rate should increase when import competition increases. There is a growing body of theo-
retical studies that consider labor market frictions in open economy settings. Helpman and
Itskhoki (2010), Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding (2010), and Cun˜at and Melitz (2007) are
recent such studies. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2014) investigated the wage-
effect of offshoring, using the Danish employer-employee matched data. However, none of
these consider workers in terms of employment flexibility. Our paper considers the effects
of globalization on the proportion of the two types of workers, permanent and temporary.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes a simple theoretical
framework to derive testable implications. Section 3 describes the matched dataset and
summary statistics. Section 4 presents the results from an empirical analysis, and Section
5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
One important characteristic of permanent workers with open-ended contracts is that firms
incur adjustment costs when those workers are dismissed. In contrast, it is much less
costly for firms to terminate temporary workers’ contracts. Many theoretical models of
permanent and temporary workers focus on the difference in adjustment costs. Examples of
earlier contributions are Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), and
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Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994). This section presents a standard model of permanent and
temporary workers, closely following Saint-Paul (1997). Although it is a partial equilibrium
analysis and highly stylized, the model reveals what motivates firms to use temporary
workers. The model is helpful to consider how economic globalization may influence firms’
demands for permanent and temporary workers.
2.1 Simple Model of Permanent and Temporary Workers
Because the model is standard, we only briefly describe its setup and results. Assume
that identical firms maximize their expected discounted value of profits. In each period,
firms obtain zf(n) of revenue, where z is an independent and identically distributed shock
following the cumulative distribution function G(z), and n is the effective unit of the labor
input. The function f(·) satisfies f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0, implicitly assuming the existence of
another fixed production input and simply ignoring it.
There are two types of labor contracts: open-ended and fixed-term contracts. Firms
incur a firing cost γ per worker when they dismiss workers with open-ended contracts
(permanent workers). No such cost is incurred when dismissing workers with fixed-term
contracts (temporary workers). However, using temporary labor contracts is disadvanta-
geous in terms of labor productivity because both firms and workers tend to underinvest in
firm-specific skills due to relatively high job turnover. To model this productivity difference
in a simple manner, it is assumed that permanent workers are more efficient than temporary
workers and the effective unit of labor is λ > 1 for permanent workers.5 To highlight the
trade-off between the adjustment cost and labor productivity, we assume that both types
of workers are perfectly substitutable in production and that total effective labor units is
given by n = λl + s, where l denotes the employment of permanent workers and s the
employment of temporary workers.
At the end of each time period, a firm observes an idiosyncratic shock to the revenue for
the next period. After observing this shock, the firm determines the employment size for
maximizing the expected discounted value of the firm’s profit. This problem is expressed
5Employing permanent workers is less volatile than employing temporary workers. Hence, permanent
workers may be encouraged to accumulate firm-specific skills more than temporary workers would be, re-
sulting in an efficiency difference between the two types of workers.
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in a recursive manner such that
V (lt, zt+1) = max
lt+1,st+1
zt+1f(λlt+1 + st+1)− wllt+1 (1)
− wlγmax {lt − lt+1, 0} − wsst+1 + βEtV (lt+1, zt+2),
where β denotes the discount factor and wl and ws are wage rates for permanent and
temporary workers, respectively. After observing zt+1 at the end of t, the firms determines
both lt+1 and st+1. The third term suggests that if lt+1 < lt, the firm will incur the firing
cost. We assume that these wage rates are constant over the time horizon. Since firms
must incur a firing cost when dismissing permanent workers, having the effective wage rate
of permanent workers lower than the wage rate of temporary workers is necessary for the
coexistence of both types. We thus impose the assumption λws > wl.
While it is difficult to analytically determine a value function, it is straightforward to
describe firms’ employment policies. First, observe that when the firm employs both per-
manent and temporary workers, the marginal cost for hiring permanent workers is equalized
to the marginal cost for hiring temporary workers. The marginal cost of temporary workers
is simply the wage rate ws. The marginal cost of permanent workers includes the expected
value of the firing cost. Denoting the expected firing cost as βh(lt+1), the condition for
employing both types of workers simultaneously is given by
wl + βh(lt+1)
λ
= ws, (2)
which implies that the employment of permanent workers is time invariant as long as the
firm employs both permanent and temporary workers. It is known that the expected firing
cost βh(l) is increasing in l, the employment level of permanent workers (for the derivation
of h(l); see the Appendix). Intuitively, as the employment of permanent workers increases,
it is more likely for the firm to dismiss permanent workers when facing a negative shock to
z.
Total employment is determined by profit maximization. The marginal revenue from
increasing temporary workers must be equal to the wage rate of temporary workers as long
as the firm employs both permanent and temporary workers. Namely,
zf ′(nt+1) = ws. (3)
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The intuition of equations (2) and (3) is illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, the
marginal cost of temporary workers is a horizontal line at ws, while the marginal cost
of permanent workers, (wl + βh(l))/λ, is an upward-sloping schedule. Equation (2) is
represented at pointA, which shows the upper boundary of permanent workers, l¯. The figure
depicts three different shocks z1 > z2 > z3. If z1 is realized, then the total employment
level is determined at the intersection of the marginal revenue schedule z1f
′(n) and the
marginal cost line ws (point C). Notice that the firm does not change the employment level
of permanent workers as long as the realized z is greater than z3; the firm responds to all
fluctuations above z3 by changing the level of temporary workers. This prediction captures
one important characteristic of temporary workers: they function as a buffer against output
fluctuations. This implies that the ratio of temporary to permanent workers is positively
correlated with firm output.
In addition to occasional output fluctuations, the ratio of temporary to permanent
workers may change for several structural reasons. First, as the relative productivity of
permanent workers increases (λ ↑), the marginal cost of permanent workers declines (a
downward shift of (wl+βh(l))/λ). Thus, the upper boundary of permanent workers l¯ rises,
which decreases the ratio of temporary to permanent workers. Second, decreases in the
firing cost γ lower the expected firing cost βh(l), which also yields a downward shift of
(wl + βh(l))/λ. As a result, the temporary ratio declines. Third, it is known that as firms’
revenues become more volatile, the expected firing cost tends to increase (Saint-Paul, 1997).
Consequently, the ratio of temporary workers tends to increase.
Figure 1 also shows that the introduction of temporary workers leads to firms’ cost
reduction. For example, suppose that temporary labor contracts are unavailable due to
legal restrictions. Then, the firm’s employment choice is point D rather than point C when
the realized shock is z1. One can see immediately that the marginal cost that the firm
faces goes down to ws. Thus, firms can reduce unit production costs by using temporary
contracts.
2.2 Impact of Globalization
The discussion so far has highlighted the roles played by the expected firing cost and the
relative productivity of permanent workers. Based on these insights, we conjecture the
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following two channels through which economic globalization may influence employment of
permanent and temporary workers.
FDI and outsourcing: Consider a firm that can choose a production location from either
the home country or a foreign country. It is assumed that setting up a plant in a foreign
country is more costly than in the home country (Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004).
In this framework, domestic labor is imperfectly substitutable by foreign labor. Suppose
that the FDI setup cost decreases. FDI will thereby become easier, and a small positive
shock to z will be sufficient for switching the production location from the home country
to the foreign country.6 In such a situation, the expected firing cost will increase for firms
currently engaged in local production (when switching production locations, firms must
lay off domestic workers). As a result, firms increase the ratio of temporary to permanent
workers in domestic production. The same logic works for outsourcing to foreign firms.
Product market competition: In the model, it is assumed that permanent workers are
more productive than temporary workers, characterized by λ. This assumption is plausible
because firms can use job security as a device to raise worker efficiency. The source of
the efficiency increase is attributable either to relation-specific investment or to reduction
of information asymmetry between an employer and workers (e.g., the efficiency wage dis-
cussion). In either case, the durability of the relationship between the firm and workers
is crucial. It is likely that economic globalization intensifies product market competition,
which makes the relationship between the firm and workers less durable. For example, R&D
activity encouraged by international flows of knowledge capital accelerates the introduction
of new products (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). In such a case, it becomes difficult for
firms to incentivize workers to maintain the level of λ by offering job security. This means
a decline of λ, resulting in decreases in the demand for permanent workers.
A key intuition of the model is that when the likelihood of labor adjustment and its
size increase, the expected firing cost of permanent workers will increase, leading to the re-
6One may consider a firm’s investment decision in which, when facing uncertainty regarding future
demand or productivity, the firm chooses an appropriate timing for opening a new factory abroad. The
firm starts the foreign factory only when it receives demand (or productivity) shocks above a certain level.
Decreases in sunk entry costs lower the threshold shock level, thereby increasing the probability of FDI. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for detailed discussions.
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placement of permanent workers with temporary workers. Furthermore, higher likelihood of
layoffs may discourage permanent workers from accumulating firm-specific skills, thus low-
ering the productivity advantage over temporary workers.7 Both channels of globalization
are plausible, and we test the empirical validity of these channels in the following.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.1 Workers and Indicators of Globalization
We perform industry-level panel regressions to examine the impact of globalization on tem-
porary workers as it affects the total labor input over time within an industry. Based on
the theoretical framework discussed in the previous section, we focus on whether economic
globalization is attributable to increases in the relative demand for temporary workers over
permanent workers. It is ideal to develop a well-specified model in which firms engaging in
international activities such as trade and FDI endogenously determine their demands for
temporary and permanent workers and to estimate structural equations. However, there are
several channels through which economic globalization influences firms’ relative demand for
temporary workers. Although we suggested two possible channels in the previous section,
we are not certain which channel better describes the recent increase of temporary workers
among Japanese manufacturers. Thus, we estimate reduced-form equations of the ratio of
temporary workers to total labor inputs on various indices of globalization, controlling for
the effects of other potential causes. We estimate the reduced-form regression
RTWit = X
′
gitβg +X
′
itβ + di + dt + uit, (4)
where RTWit is the ratio of temporary workers to permanent workers in industry i at time t,
Xgit is a set of explanatory variables to measure globalization, Xit is a set of control variables
including technological changes, and di and dt represent industry and time-fixed effects, re-
spectively. The industry dummy variables absorb all unobservable industry-specific effects.
For example, some industries may intrinsically have high demand for temporary workers
depending on the variability of their business. The year dummies absorb all time effects
7It is also possible that permanent workers are willing to accumulate firm-specific skills in an attempt
at lowering the probability of layoffs. Thus, the effect of the possibility of layoffs on permanent workers’
incentive to invest in firm-specific skills is an empirical question.
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common across industries. In particular, we expect that the year dummies appropriately
deal with the effect of the Worker Dispatching Act in 2004. As already mentioned in the In-
troduction, private temporary job agencies in Japan have been allowed to dispatch workers
to manufacturers since 2004. Indeed, a large number of private temporary job agencies has
emerged, and the number of dispatched workers in the manufacturing sector has grown since
this change. We control for the impact of this policy change by year dummies. In addition,
as Wasmer (1999) suggests, business cycles could influence the demand for permanent and
temporary workers. The year dummies also absorb all such macroeconomic effects.8
In addition to the ratio of temporary workers to total workers, it is important to examine
changes in the number of permanent and temporary workers. The theory in the previous
section suggests that globalization is likely to affect the relative demand for temporary
to permanent workers by lowering the upper boundary of permanent workers. Hence, we
estimate equation (4) by replacing the dependent variable with the number of permanent
and temporary workers as
PWit = X
′
gitβPg +X
′
itβP + di + dt + uit, (5)
TWit = X
′
gitβTg +X
′
itβT + di + dt + uit, (6)
where PWit and TWit are (the log of) the number of permanent and temporary workers in
industry i at time t. We expect that the effects of globalization should be found mainly in
βPg. By contrast, the effect of output should tend to be found in βT if the employment of
temporary workers works as a buffer agains output fluctuations.
Because there is no single publicly available dataset containing information about both
industry activities and the Japanese labor market, we collect our data from different sources.
For information about permanent and temporary workers, we use the Establishment and
Enterprise Census. Covering all sites and firms, the census provides detailed workforce
information according to the three-digit Japanese Industrial Classification. The data are
8Another macroeconomic effect in the Japanese labor markets is increases in social insurance taxes (e.g.,
unemployment insurance, pension fund, and health insurance). Japanese firms are obliged to incur these
taxes partially for the employment of permanent workers, but can evade such burden for temporary workers
when certain labor conditions are satisfied. Thus, when the government increases social insurance taxes, the
relative labor cost of permanent to temporary workers would increase, which leading to a higher temporary
ratio. Such government policy changes are in general uniform across sectors. Thus, the year dummy also
appropriately absorbs this effect.
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available for four years (1999, 2001, 2004, and 2006).9 We focus on the manufacturing sector
because our primary interest is in the impact of economic globalization on the shift from
permanent to temporary employment. One appealing characteristic of the Establishment
and Enterprise Census is the comprehensive coverage of firms and detailed classifications of
the workforce. The census reports the total number of workers, the number of employees, the
number of permanent employees, the number of temporary employees, and the number of
workers dispatched from temporary employment agencies. We define total labor input as the
sum of permanent employees, temporary employees, and workers dispatched from temporary
employment agencies. We also define the number of temporary workers as the sum of
temporary employees and workers dispatched from temporary employment agencies. The
share of temporary workers among total labor input is calculated for each manufacturing
industry.
We construct explanatory variables using the Japan Industrial Productivity Database
2009 (JIP 2009) and the UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT). The JIP
2009 database contains annual data on 108 sectors covering the entire Japanese economy
from 1970 to 2006, counting 52 manufacturing sectors. The INDSTAT provides production-
related data such as labor input and value added according to the three-digit ISIC Revision
3 classification. We use value added for OECD countries in the INDSTAT. Based on these
two databases, we construct FDI/outsourcing, product market competition, and technology-
related indicators for each manufacturing industry. We start with indicators related to
globalization:
• Foreign-affiliate labor: The size of employment at foreign affiliates comes from JIP
2009 and attempts to measure the likelihood of FDI expansion. Based on our hypoth-
esis on FDI in the previous section, we expect that industries more relying on foreign
workers through FDI tend to exhibit high temporary worker ratios at home.
• Share of imported intermediate goods: This index attempts to capture the extent
to which each industry relies on imported intermediate inputs as a proxy index of
outsourcing. We construct this index using the input-output table and import data
9The Japanese government began the Economic Census, a new comprehensive census, in 2010 as a
replacement for the Establishment and Enterprise Census. The latest data from the Establishment and
Enterprise Census is for 2006.
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in JIP 2009. Based on our hypothesis on outsourcing, we expect that the sign of the
coefficient is positive in the ratio of temporary workers and negative in the employment
of permanent workers.
• World share of value added: the Japanese share of value added among OECD coun-
tries. We compute this measure from the INDSTAT.10 This is a measure of how
competitive international product markets are. We interpret a decline in the share of
value added as a sign of intensified global competition and expect a negative sign in
the estimation of the ratio of temporary workers and a positive sign in the employment
of permanent workers.
• Export share: The ratio of exports to output calculated from JIP 2009. This is a
measure of the extent to which each industry relies on the world market for sales.
Assuming that the world market is more competitive than the Japanese domestic
market, we expect that the coefficient is positive in the ratio of temporary workers
and negative in the employment of permanent workers.
• Import share (import penetration): The ratio of imports to domestic absorption cal-
culated from JIP 2009. This is an alternative measure of globalization and competi-
tiveness in the world market. We expect the same sign direction as for export share.
It should be noted that the above regressors (except for the share of value added)
are endogenously determined in a fully specified model and tend to suffer from reverse
causality. For example, firms can increase foreign-affiliate workers or export simply by
reducing permanent workers and increasing temporary workers. Although we admit that it
is difficult to control for such endogeneity (or reverse causality) using our dataset, we will
use regressors lagged one year instead of contemporaneous regressors and attempt two-stage
least squares (2SLS) when applicable.
The following indicators are employed in order to control possible influences on the tem-
porary worker ratio other than economic globalization. They include industry real output,
10The INDSTAT reports value added in current U.S. dollars. Two sets of the world share of value added
are prepared. One is simply computed from the original data. For the other, we convert the unit of values
form current U.S. dollars to PPP-based U.S. dollars. PPP-based U.S. dollars are taken from the Penn World
Table 6.3. Both measures show similar results in our estimation, so we report the results of the PPP-based
world share of valued added.
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the capital-labor ratio, and variables representing technological changes. All indicators are
calculated from JIP 2009.
• Real output: Based on the model discussed in the previous section, fluctuations in
real output are mostly absorbed by the employment of temporary workers. Hence,
we expect that the coefficient of real output shows a positive sign in the regression of
the ratio and number of temporary workers, while showing statistical insignificance
in the permanent employment regression.
• Capital intensity (K/L): This may affect the demand for temporary workers in the
following ways: Saving labor adjustment costs may be less important in high-capital-
intensity industries than low-capital-intensity industries. Alternatively, firm-specific
skills may be more important in industries with high capital intensity, and such indus-
tries may hold high upper boundaries of permanent employees, showing low ratios of
temporary workers. We expect that the coefficient is negative in the temporary-ratio
regression and positive in the permanent-employment regression.
• Total-factor-productivity (TFP): This index measures changes in productivity. It
is a priori uncertain how TFP would affect the relative employment of temporary
to permanent workers. On the one hand, if it captures Hicks-neutral technological
change, it is highly likely that this index is neutral in the ratio of temporary workers.
Conditioning upon real output, this index will be insignificant in both temporary
and permanent employment regressions. On the other hand, production labor may
become more substitutable by new technology, which in turn may raise the expected
labor adjustment costs. As a result, the ratio of temporary workers may rise and the
employment of permanent workers may decrease.
• Information technology (IT): The recent literature on “job polarization” emphasizes
that the rapid development of IT (computerization) has encouraged replacing labor for
routine tasks, decreasing the demand for middle-skilled jobs relative to high-skilled
and low-skilled jobs (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).11 Firms are likely to use
11Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) and Goos and Manning (2007) study the effect of computerization
and outsourcing on job polarization.
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temporary labor contracts or dispatched workers for routine jobs, resulting in increases
in demand for temporary workers. We use the ratio of computers and other IT-related
equipment to total labor input (IT-capital intensity) as a proxy of the prevalence of
IT. The share in total capital stock of computers and other IT-related equipment will
be used as an alternative measure.
• Demographic changes: It is well known that elderly workers and female workers tend to
have temporary labor contracts. Thus, increases in elderly workers or female workers
can raise the ratio of temporary workers. To control for these effects, we include the
ratio of workers aged 55 or over and the ratio of female workers.
To match the data from the Establishment and Enterprise Census with those constructed
from JIP 2009 and UNIDO’s INDSTAT, we use the industrial classification of JIP 2009 to
the greatest extent possible. Although we have to merge some industries, we can construct a
balanced longitudinal dataset of 45 manufacturing industries between 1996 and 2006, where
the labor data with labor classifications are limited to four periods (1999, 2001, 2004, and
2006).
3.2 Temporary Workers in Japan
Before proceeding to estimation, it is useful to observe the data of temporary and perma-
nent workers. Table 1 presents the ratio of temporary workers to total workers across 45
manufacturing sectors in Japan. The first two columns, the ratios of temporary workers in
1999 and 2006, show that shifts from permanent to temporary workers occurred in almost
all manufacturing sectors. The top five sectors with high ratios of temporary workers in
2006 are Other Processed Food (4), Fish Products (2), Meat Products (1), Glass Products
(23), and Plastic Products (44). Leather Products (14) and Beverages (6) also have high
ratios of temporary workers. The ratio in Other Processed Food reaches approximately
60%. However, these sectors tend to have high temporary worker ratios as of 1999, and the
shifts from permanent to temporary workers were not so striking.
More dramatic shifts from permanent to temporary workers can be found in Motor
Vehicles (41) and Chemical Fibers and Textiles (18). The third column presents the average
annual growth rate of the ratio of temporary workers during 1999–2006. Motor Vehicle
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records a more than 10% annual growth rate, and Chemical Fibers and Textiles follow
at about 9%. The fourth column presents annual growth rates of the ratio of temporary
workers during 2004–06. In most industries, the average growth rates per annum of this
period fall bellow those in the full sample period, which implies that the effect of the Worker
Dispatching Act in 2004 may be limited.
The Establishment and Enterprise Census allows including information about the num-
ber of permanent and temporary workers by enterprise size measured as the number of
employees. Although we are unable to use these data for estimation because of inaccessi-
bility to matched firm-activity data, observing which firms change the relative demand for
temporary workers is helpful to interpret estimation results. Figure 2 presents changes in
the ratio of temporary workers between 1999 and 2006 by establishment size. The figure
shows that (i) as of 1999, the ratio of temporary workers tended to be lower as the size
of establishment increases, (ii) the shift from permanent to temporary workers mainly oc-
curred in relatively larger establishments, and (iii) as a result, the variety of the ratios of
temporary workers across establishments substantially decreased. The recent literature of
heterogeneous trade firms has empirically revealed that only sufficiently productive firms
can cover fixed entry costs and will be internationalized through trade and FDI.12 Because
the size of enterprises is in general positively correlated to their productivity, the figure
suggests that temporary workers dramatically increased among enterprises that are likely
to be engaged in international activities such as trade and FDI.
Summary statistics on the explanatory variables mentioned above are reported in Table
2. Because some measures including the world share of value added are limited to the nine
years between 1997 and 2005, we take the same period for other measures. It should be
noted that JIP 2009 does not report FDI-related data for three industries—Fish Products
(2), Grain Mill Products (3), and Other Processed Food (4)—due to the number of firms
being too small. In addition, Tobacco (7) has no foreign affiliates in the sample period. As
for the world share of value added, we find that the Japanese share is incredibly high (more
than 80%) in Coal Products (22), which is simply because some countries’ data are not
12These studies include Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) for the United States, Tomiura (2007)
for Japan, Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for various EU countries, and Kasahara and Lapham (2013) for some
developing countries.
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reported in the INDSTAT. We therefore drop the coal product industry from our sample,
leaving 40 industries for most regressions.
Table 2 confirms that Japanese manufacturers have reduced the employment of per-
manent workers (defined as full-time workers) and increased temporary workers during the
sample period. In particular, among temporary workers, they have substantially increased
the use of dispatched workers. As for globalization-related variables, the number of foreign-
affiliate workers has slightly increased, while the share of imported input (a proxy for foreign
outsourcing) increased more distinctively from about 6.1% to 8.6%. The world share of value
added also has decreased by 0.7 percentage points during the sample period. The export
share, signifying commitment to competing in the world market, has increased from 13.7%
to 17.6%, while the import share, a proxy variable for the degree of domestic competition
with foreign products, has increased from 10% to 14.4%.
We now turn to the variables representing industrial characteristics and technological
changes. TFP has slightly improved during the sample period. While Japanese manufac-
turers have increased their capital stock by about 44% during the sample period, they have
increased the IT-related capital stock more aggressively, resulting in an increase in the share
of IT-related capital in total capital by 2 percentage points. The share of elderly workers
has increased by 5%, but that of female workers has declined during the sample period.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Impact on Temporary Ratio
The estimation results on the ratio of temporary workers to total labor input are reported in
Table 3. While column (1) excludes explanatory variables related to technological changes,
the results are almost same as those in the full specification reported in column (2). The
coefficients of year dummies and fixed effects by industry are suppressed for brevity.13
The effect of outsourcing measured by the share of imported intermediate goods is pos-
itive and significant. Because the ratios of temporary workers and imported intermediates
are expressed as percentages, a parameter estimate of 0.44 implies that a 10% increase in the
13The year dummies which we expect to capture the impact of the policy change in 2004 are positive and
significant. In particular, the magnitude of year dummies for 2004 and 2006 is much greater than that of
the year dummy for 2001, which would imply that the year dummies appropriately pick up the impact of
the policy change in 2004.
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share of imported intermediates will raise the ratio of temporary workers by 4.4 percentage
points. In contrast, the coefficient of foreign-affiliate labor is not statistically significant
in both specifications. These results support our hypothesis on outsourcing but not on
FDI; while industries with more outsourcing tend to increase the relative use of temporary
workers, industries relying more on foreign-affiliate labor do not affect the domestic share
of temporary workers.
As is expected, the impact of increases in world share of value added is negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level (column (1)), implying that the share of temporary
workers increases when industries experience some loss of world share of value added. When
estimated with explanatory variables on technology, world share of value added is still
significant at the 5% level without altering the sign and size of the coefficient. Furthermore,
in both specifications, we obtain positive and statistically significant coefficients for export
share. Industries with larger increases in export tend to increase the ratio of temporary
workers in total labor input.
Import share shows a negative significant sign in this specification, which implies that
industries with larger increases in import penetration tend to decrease the share of tem-
porary workers in total labor input. If the import share used here correctly captures the
degree of competition pressure from abroad, this result seems to contradict our hypothesis.
With respect to industry characteristics, real output is significant at the 1% level with the
correct sign. The parameter estimate of 0.06 implies that a 10% increase in real output will
raise the share of temporary workers by 0.6 percentage points. This estimate is consistent
with the theoretical model. Capital intensity is also statistically significant and shows a
negative sign, which is reasonable. However, the effect is almost negligible.
Technology-related variables such as the log of TFP and IT-capital intensity in general
do not have significant explanatory power for the ratio of temporary workers.14 This result—
the ineffectiveness of IT on the ratio of temporary workers—appears inconsistent with the
main idea in the literature of “job polarization,” because we expect that the job routinization
caused by IT will increase the demand for temporary workers.
Overall, the estimation results indicate correlation between relative increases in the
14Replacing IT-capital intensity with IT-capital share does not alter the estimation results.
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employment of temporary workers and some globalization indices in the Japanese manufac-
turing sector. In contrast, technological change in the IT field appears to be irrelevant to
the recent shift from permanent to temporary workers.
4.2 Impact of the Employment of Permanent and Temporary Workers
The previous section revealed that the relative demand for temporary workers was correlated
to some globalization indices. To examine further how globalization would change the
demand for temporary and permanent workers, we perform regressions of the globalization
indices on the log of the employment of permanent and temporary workers, controlling for
real output, capital intensity, and technology-related variables.
Table 4 presents estimates of equations (5) and (6). We find that the estimation results
largely support the predictions of the theoretical model in Section 2. First, the coefficient
of the share of imported input is negative and significant at the 1% level with respect to
permanent workers. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithm and the share of
imported input is a percentage. Hence, an estimate of −2.5 implies that as the share of
imported input increases by 10 percentage points, the employment of permanent workers
on average will decrease by 0.25%. The world share of value added is also significant and
shows the predicted sign with respect to permanent workers. The coefficient of 1.9 is slightly
smaller than the share of imported input.
These results imply that the direction of causality is likely to be as expected from the
model’s predictions. Suppose that firms decrease domestic employment to use imported
intermediates more aggressively. However, this mechanism hardly explains the reason why
firms decrease only permanent workers, in spite of their adjustment costs. It is natural
to interpret this estimation result as meaning that increasing opportunities for using im-
ported intermediates raises the expected adjustment cost of permanent workers, so firms
reduce their employment of permanent workers. The interpretation of the results for world
share of value added is more straightforward. It is unlikely that firms decrease their perma-
nent workers, giving rise to decreases in their world share of value added in that industry.
Consequently, we confirm two convincing channels of globalization—outsourcing and world
market competition—that reduce firms’ demand for permanent workers.
In contrast, export share and import share are insignificant for permanent workers. The
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coefficient of export share is positive in the employment of temporary workers. If export
share properly represents the fierceness of world market competition, our theory suggests
lower demand for permanent workers. Thus, we should interpret this result as meaning that
firms respond to fluctuations in foreign demand by adjusting the employment of temporary
workers. The coefficient of import share is negative and significant only for temporary
workers. Probably, we should interpret this result in the same way as export share: when
import share (i.e., import penetration to domestic markets) is high, firms adjust their
output decreases by reducing their employment of temporary workers. Thus, we conclude
that export share and import share do not capture the effect of globalization on the relative
demand of permanent to temporary workers.
Other explanatory variables largely confirm the validity of the regressions. The co-
efficient of the log of real output is positive and significant only for temporary workers,
consistent with the theory. The coefficient of TFP is insignificant for both permanent and
temporary workers, which suggests that there is no room for TFP to influence the employ-
ment of permanent and temporary workers after controlling for output.15 Capital intensity
affects only permanent workers, but is almost negligible in magnitude. IT-capital intensity
is insignificant for both permanent and temporary workers, which clearly denies the effect
of the prevalence of IT-technology.16 Increases in the ratio of female workers raises the
employment of temporary workers. This result is also consistent with the fact that the
share of temporary workers is higher among female workers than male workers.
The demand for dispatched workers—one category of temporary workers—was directly
influenced by the policy change in 2004. We control for the impact of the policy change in
2004 by year dummies. Thus, if the impact of globalization on the employment of dispatched
workers can be observed similarly to temporary workers, it will be strong evidence for
the impact of globalization on the demand for temporary workers. We replace temporary
workers with dispatched workers in column (3). The results are similar to those reported in
column (2), except for the fact that world share of value added is significantly negative in
estimating the employment of dispatched workers and import share becomes insignificant.
15However, as Table 2 shows, TFP has hardly changed during the sample period. We note that this
particular trend of TFP might contribute to generating these insignificant results.
16Using IT-capital share in total capital stock instead of IT-capital intensity does not change the results
at all, and we thereby do not report this in detail.
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Overall, the policy change in 2004 directly influenced manufacturers’ demand for dis-
patched workers. Nevertheless, we find evidence that some globalization indicators still
hold explanatory power. Therefore, we conclude that economic globalization decreases the
demand for permanent workers, holding other factors constant. Employing industry-level
datasets, we find that more outsourcing (proxied by increases in the share of imported in-
puts) tends to decreases the employment of permanent workers. Using Japanese firm-level
panel data, Tomiura, Ito, and Wakasugi (2011) also found that that offshoring firms de-
pend significantly less on regular full-time workers, which is consistent with our findings. In
addition, we find that in industries where world value added share declines, firms tend to
reduce the employment of permanent workers. This is another globalization conduit that we
identified. Furthermore, we show that firms are encouraged to hire more temporary workers
when their sales increasingly rely on foreign markets (increases in export share), or when
their market positions deteriorate (decreases in world share in valued added). These results
confirm that firms use more temporary workers as a buffer against output fluctuations from
globalized market competition.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In the previous section, we found that in industries with a higher share of imported inputs,
firms tend to reduce the employment of permanent workers. Our theory suggests that more
outsourcing decreases the relative demand for permanent workers to temporary workers.
Although our findings are based on panel regressions with fixed effects, they may still be
insufficient to establish causality between outsourcing and the domestic non-regularization
of employment. This section performs two-stage least squares (2SLS) to verify our findings
about outsourcing.
We use the event of the Chinese accession to the WTO in 2001 as a natural experimental
event. As we will verify, this event is highly likely to affect Japanese firms’ outsourcing
activity, but not directly influence firms’ decisions on the relative demand for permanent
workers. More concretely, we make an instrumental variable by multiplying the share of
trade (export plus import) with China in total trade with a time dummy that takes 0 before
year 2001 but 1 afterwards.
The results are reported in Table 5. To appropriately specify the first-stage regression,
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we dropped export share and import share, which were insignificant in the fixed-effect
regressions in Table 4. The share of imported inputs remains statistically significant in all
specifications (columns (1), (2), and (3)). The first-stage F-values prove that the first stage
is appropriately specified. The coefficient of the share of imported input increases in 2SLS,
compared to that in the OLS with fixed effects, which suggests that the simultaneity of the
employment of permanent workers and outsourcing is likely to underestimate the impact
of outsourcing on the employment of permanent workers. Interestingly, the log of foreign-
affiliate labor (column (3)) is significantly negative, which supports our first hypothesis.
5 Conclusions
This paper attempted to test if economic globalization such as FDI, outsourcing, and exports
raises firms’ demand for temporary workers relative to permanent workers. For this purpose,
we constructed an industry-level panel dataset, matching employment statistics from the
Establishments and Enterprise Census with production and trade related data from JIP
2009 and UNIDO’s INDSTAT.
Before estimation, we considered potential channels through which economic globaliza-
tion may change the demand structure for permanent and temporary workers by employing
a standard model of temporary and permanent workers. We identified two possible chan-
nels, FDI or outsourcing and product competition in the world market. In particular, the
theoretical model emphasized that (i) a firm sets an upper boundary for the employment
of permanent workers and uses temporary workers to fill the gap between its actual labor
demand and the upper boundary of permanent workers, and that (ii) economic globalization
structurally lowers the firm’s upper boundary for permanent workers.
Various indicators capturing the impact of the two globalization channels were con-
structed along with indicators for controlling for industry characteristics. However, the
model’s predictions guided us to identify the globalization channels; globalization indica-
tors that affect the employment of permanent workers are likely to prove to be correct
channels, while globalization indicators that affect the employment of temporary workers
are likely to merely reflect firms’ response to output fluctuations coming from international
markets.
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Our main findings are as follows: First, increases in outsourcing raise the ratio of tem-
porary workers to total labor input by decreasing the employment of permanent workers.
Second, the world share of value added showed the correct sign; industries tend to decrease
the relative demand for permanent workers when losing competitive positions in the world
market. Probably, in such industries, firms consider the probability that employment reduc-
tion becomes higher, which raises the expected firing costs. Third, when firms come to rely
on foreign sales or face higher import penetration in their markets, they increase the de-
mand for temporary workers without altering the employment of permanent workers. These
effects are captured by increases in export share and import share. In sum, we conclude
that the first two channels of globalization, outsourcing and world market competition, may
explain the structural demand shift toward temporary workers in Japanese manufacturers.
Although the estimation presented several plausible results, it also contains several qual-
ifications. First, the current empirical analysis is confined to industry-level data, although
we reinforced our globalization hypothesis by presenting the fact that the recent employ-
ment shift to temporary workers has mainly occurred among large establishments. However,
using firm- or establishment-level data with location information can definitely enrich our
study in terms of more precisely identifying globalization channels. An extension of the
analysis along these lines is promising. Second, though related to the first, increasing sam-
ple size is evidently desirable. For example, we could not find the effect of FDI, while the
effect of outsourcing on permanent workers is found to be robust. This is a puzzling result.
Larger datasets might help to solve this puzzle. These issues are left for future research.
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Table 1: Ratio of Temporary Workers in 1999 and 2006 and its Growth Rates
Code Industry Ratio of Temporary Workers Annual Growth Rate
1999 2006 1999–2006 2004–2006
1 Meat products 0.44 0.50 1.6 −1.3
2 Fish products 0.50 0.54 0.9 −0.9
3 Grain mill products 0.25 0.32 3.4 3.7
4 Other processed food 0.51 0.58 1.8 0.1
5 Prepared animal feeds 0.24 0.31 3.8 6.3
6 Beverages 0.30 0.36 2.4 −1.7
7 Tobacco 0.06 0.09 6.2 30.2
8 Textiles and fabrics 0.30 0.32 1.0 −1.3
9 Wood products 0.17 0.23 3.9 0.6
10 Furniture 0.17 0.25 5.1 3.4
11 Pulp, paper, and paperboard 0.11 0.15 4.0 −1.9
12 Other paper products 0.25 0.30 2.8 −0.4
13 Printing 0.18 0.22 2.4 −1.8
14 Leather products 0.37 0.37 0.2 −2.8
15 Rubber products 0.23 0.33 5.4 3.6
16 Fertilizer 0.13 0.18 4.7 5.2
17 Chemical products 0.13 0.17 4.5 9.9
18 Chemical fiber and textiles 0.13 0.24 9.1 11.3
19 Other chemical products 0.21 0.29 4.5 0.7
20 Pharmaceutical 0.13 0.21 7.1 4.1
21 Refined petroleum products 0.08 0.12 6.4 3.2
22 Coal products 0.16 0.19 2.3 1.7
23 Glass products 0.26 0.38 5.6 4.9
24 Cement and concrete 0.15 0.22 4.8 5.9
25 Ceramics 0.21 0.29 5.0 2.6
26 Other ceramic products 0.15 0.22 5.9 4.8
27 Pig iron and steel 0.13 0.13 −0.6 13.5
28 Other iron and steel products 0.12 0.20 7.4 0.8
29 Non-ferrous metal refining 0.18 0.23 2.9 2.6
30 Non-ferrous metal 0.17 0.24 5.0 1.2
31 Architectural metal products 0.20 0.25 3.6 2.9
32 Other metal products 0.22 0.28 3.3 1.0
33 General industrial machinery 0.14 0.22 6.9 7.5
34 Office machinery 0.26 0.30 2.2 −7.2
35 Heavy electrical machinery 0.20 0.31 6.1 7.8
36 Radio and Television 0.22 0.32 5.2 0.6
37 Accounting and computing machines 0.23 0.33 5.3 2.3
38 Electronic instrument 0.22 0.32 5.2 0.2
39 Electronic parts 0.23 0.32 5.1 0.3
40 Other electrical equipment 0.22 0.33 5.9 6.3
41 Motor vehicle and its parts 0.14 0.29 10.6 5.5
42 Other transport equipment 0.24 0.29 2.8 2.1
43 Precision machinery 0.21 0.29 5.0 1.8
44 Plastic products 0.30 0.38 3.1 −0.1
45 Other manufacturing 0.29 0.33 1.9 −0.3
Notes: Authors’ calculation based on Establishment and Enterprise Census and JIP database 2009. The
industry code is from JIP database 2009. Growth rates are in percent.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables
Growth Rate
Dependent & Explanatory Variables 1999 2006 1999–2006 2004–2006
Ratio of temporary workers (RTW) 0.207 0.275 33.1 3.9
(0.073) (0.075) (2.8) (−7.9)
ln(Permanent) 11.741 11.556 −1.6 0.0
(0.943) (0.947) (0.4) (1.2)
ln(Temporary) 9.808 9.968 1.6 −0.4
(1.409) (1.241) (−11.9) (0.5)
ln(Dispatched) 9.152 9.548 4.3 2.1
(0.954) (1.101) (15.4) (3.5)
1998 2005 1998–2005 2003–2005
FDI/Outsourcing
ln(Foreign-affiliate labor) 10.351 10.409 0.6 0.0
(1.357) (1.561) (15.1) (8.8)
Share of imported input 0.061 0.086 40.2 11.4
(0.044) (0.076) (73.8) (9.0)
Product market competition
World share of value added 0.151 0.144 −4.3 0.3
(0.051) (0.058) (13.6) (8.2)
Export share 0.137 0.176 29.0 12.8
(0.124) (0.163) (31.4) (10.2)
Import share 0.100 0.144 44.5 12.5
(0.098) (0.133) (35.5) (10.0)
Industry characteristics
ln(Output) 15.365 15.324 −0.3 0.2
(0.879) (1.008) (14.8) (4.5)
Capital intensity 28.462 41.036 44.2 13.4
(41.721) (61.275) (46.9) (13.7)
ln(TFP) 4.744 4.786 0.9 0.6
(0.206) (0.302) (46.8) (14.4)
IT-Capital share 0.111 0.130 17.2 8.9
(0.066) (0.076) (16.1) (8.1)
IT-Capital intensity 2.803 4.783 70.6 26.0
(3.445) (5.615) (63.0) (30.5)
Elderly workers share 0.208 0.249 19.8 3.1
(0.066) (0.075) (14.0) (3.3)
Female workers share 0.306 0.275 −10.0 −5.5
(0.117) (0.108) (−8.1) (−4.8)
Source: JIP 2009 and UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT). The estimated sample
drops following four industries: Fish products, Grain mill products, Processed food, and Tobacco.
These four industries do not report FDI-related data in the sample period. The estimated sample
also drops coal products which is the Japanese share of value added is incredibly high. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Impact of Globalization on the Ratio of Temporary Workers
(1) (2)
Dependent variable RTW RTW
ln(Foreign-affiliate labor) 0.008 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Share of imported input 0.438∗∗ 0.441∗∗
(0.147) (0.148)
World share of value added −0.376∗∗ −0.370∗
(0.149) (0.149)
Export share 0.149∗∗ 0.146∗∗
(0.036) (0.038)
Import share −0.202∗∗ −0.204∗∗
(0.059) (0.061)
ln(Output) 0.063∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Capital intensity −0.000∗ −0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Elderly workers −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Female workers 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(TFP) 0.005
(0.013)
IT-Capital intensity 0.000
(0.001)
Observations 160 160
R
2 0.890 0.890
Notes: Fixed effects regression with time-specific effects. All regressors related to
globalization lagged one-year. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust
standard errors are in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Impact of Globalization on the Employment of Permanent,
Temporary, and Dispatched Workers
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Permanent) ln (Temporary) ln(Dispatched)
ln(Foreign-affiliate labor) −0.032 −0.008 0.112
(0.042) (0.052) (0.117)
Share of imported input −2.482∗∗ 0.568 −0.616
(0.625) (0.493) (1.647)
World share of value added 1.885∗ −1.047 −4.460∗
(0.860) (0.676) (1.917)
Export share 0.425 1.101∗∗ 1.478∗
(0.262) (0.281) (0.728)
Import share −0.042 −1.221∗∗ −1.563
(0.475) (0.433) (1.211)
ln(Output) 0.062 0.349∗∗ 0.743∗∗
(0.085) (0.091) (0.199)
Capital intensity 0.002∗ 0.000 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
ln(TFP) −0.045 −0.019 −0.001
(0.079) (0.079) (0.192)
IT-Capital intensity −0.007 0.002 −0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.015)
Elderly workers −0.012 −0.032∗ −0.108∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.035)
Female workers 0.008 0.028∗∗ 0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.024)
Observations 160 160 160
R
2 0.787 0.747 0.676
Notes: Fixed effects regression with time-specific effects. All regressors related to
globalization lagged one-year. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust
standard errors are in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** signifi-
cant at 1%.
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Table 5: Impact of Globalization on the Employment of Permanent
Workers (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3)
ln(Permanent) ln(Permanent) ln(Permanent)
Share of imported input −2.911∗ −3.583∗∗ −3.170∗∗
(1.382) (1.180) (1.040)
World share of value added 2.246∗∗∗ 1.867∗∗
(0.632) (0.581)
ln(Foreign-affiliate labor) −0.049∗
(0.022)
ln(Output) 0.149+ 0.082 0.066
(0.086) (0.076) (0.074)
Capital intensity −0.000 −0.000 0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(TFP) −0.071 −0.002 −0.025
(0.066) (0.071) (0.067)
IT-Capital intensity 0.002 0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Elderly workers −0.005 −0.002 −0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Female workers 0.014 0.010 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 160 160 160
R
2 0.723 0.750 0.778
First Stage F-stat 21.254 20.702 17.564
Notes: Fixed effects regression with time-specific effects. All regressors related
to globalization lagged one-year. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation ro-
bust standard errors are in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%.
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Figure 1: Determination of Employment
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Figure 2: Ratio of Temporary Workers by Establishment Size
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A Derivation of the Expected Firing Cost
Defining EtV (lt+1, zt+2) such that H(lt+1) ≡ EtV (lt+1, zt+2), the FOCs with respect to
permanent workers are as follows:
zt+1λf
′(λlt+1 + st+1)− βh(lt+1) = wl if lt+1 > lt, (A.1)
zt+1λf
′(λlt+1 + st+1)− βh(lt+1) = wl(1− γ) if lt+1 < lt, (A.2)
where h(lt+1) ≡ −H
′(lt+1). These FOCs imply that the marginal value of permanent
workers is equal to the marginal cost. The marginal cost of permanent workers is lower when
the firm dismisses them than when it hires them. This is because by firing an additional
permanent worker, the firm can save the wage rate wl, but must pay the firing cost wlγ.
The right-hand side of the FOCs, the marginal value of permanent workers is the
marginal revenue earned by permanent workers, zt+1λf
′(lt+1 + st+1), plus the discounted
expected firing cost βh(lt+1). Thus, h(lt+1) is the shadow price of the stock of permanent
workers at t+ 1, which is nothing but the expected value of the firing cost per worker.
The threshold zM above which the firm increases permanent workers is given by setting
lt+1 = lt in (A.1):
zMλf
′(λlt + st+1)− βh(lt) = wl ⇒ zM (λlt + st+1) =
wl + βh(lt)
λf ′(λlt + st+1)
. (A.3)
Likewise, the threshold zm below which the firm decreases permanent workers is given by
setting lt+1 = lt in (A.2): that is,
zmλf
′(λlt + st+1)− βh(lt) = wl ⇒ zm(λlt + st+1) =
wl(1− γ) + βh(lt)
λf ′(λlt + st+1)
(A.4)
Because of the firing cost, zm < zM . We obtain a well-known result that there exist a range
of z where the firm does not change the employment level of permanent workers. Namely,
lt+1 = lt, if wl(1− γ) < zt+1λf
′(lt + st+1)− βh(lt) < wl. (A.5)
The h function can be calculated as follows. Differentiating (1) with respect to lt, we
obtain
∂V
∂lt
(lt, zt+1) =


−wlγ, if lt+1 < lt ;
zt+1λf
′(λlt + st+1) + βh(lt)− wl, if lt+1 = lt;
0, if lt+1 > lt,
(A.6)
where h(lt) = Et−1∂V (lt, zt+1)/∂lt. With the two threshold conditions for z in (A.3) and
(A.4), h(lt) is given by
h(lt) = −Et−1
∂V
∂lt
(lt, zt+1)
= wlγG(zm)−
∫ zM
zm
[λzf ′(λlt + st+1)− λws]dG(z) (βh(lt) = wl − λwsis used)
= λf ′(λlt + st+1)
∫ zM
zm
G(z)dz (Integrating by parts). (A.7)
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